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FINDING FOR DEFENDANT IN WRONGFUL DEATH
ACTION PRECLUDES SUBSEQUENT PERSONAL
INJURY SUIT BY STATUTORY BENEFICIARY
Brinkman v. The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.
111 Ohio App. 317, 172 N.E.2d 154 (1960)
This action was brought by the next friend of a minor to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained when an automobile in which the
minor and her mother were passengers was struck at a crossing by a train
operated by defendant. The mother was killed, and in a prior wrongful
death action brought by the administrator of the mother's estate, a verdict
was returned in favor of the defendant. In the wrongful death action,
the girl, her brother, and her sister were the statutory beneficiaries. In this
separate action for personal injuries, the defendant set up the defense of res
judicata and estoppel by judgment, based upon the verdict in the wrongful
death action which established that the defendant was not negligent. The
defense was allowed and on appeal the judgment was affirmed.
A great many courts and legal writers treat "res judicata" and "estoppel
by judgment" as synonymous. Technically speaking, this is not proper
although both doctrines have the effect of preventing the relitigation of
a prior determination.' This effect finds its justification in the public policy
of protecting the defendant from harassment and society from multiplicity
of litigation.2
In an evaluation of this decision, it must be determined whether the
result can be supported by the defense of res judicata or estoppel by
judgment. Under res judicata, a final judgment or decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction upon the merits is a bar to any subsequent suit
between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action
and is conclusive as to all matters germane thereto that were or could have
been raised. The principle of estoppel by judgment, however, is applicable
where the two causes of action are different, in which case the judgment in
the first suit only estops the parties or their privies from litigating in the
second suit issues common to both causes of action which were actually
adjudicated in the prior litigation.3
In the instant case it appears that the court based its decision on both
estoppel by judgment and res judicata. The court seems to have recognized
I Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1952); Charles, "Res Adjudicata and
Estoppel by Judgment," 32 Wis. Bar Bull. 16 (June, 1959).
2 Mansker v. Dealers Transp. Co., 160 Ohio St. 255, 116 N.E.2d 3 (1953);
Arnot., 23 A.L.R.2d 710 (1952); Note, 1952 U. Ill. L.F. 306; 52 Mich. L. Rev. 289
(1953).
3 Cromwell v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351 (1877); Gordon v. Gordon, supra
note 1; Mansker v. Dealers Transp. Co., supra note 2. See also Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc.,
145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945); Scott, "Collateral Estoppel by Judgment,"
56 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1942).
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the distinction between the two defenses by referring to Gordon v. Gordon,4
but does not clearly apply the distinction in arriving at its decision.
The matter or point in dispute may be the same in two actions, and yet
involve different causes of action, in which case res judicata is not applicable
and a prior judgment is no bar to the second action.5 In the factual situation
out of which the principal case arose, there were two separate and distinct
causes of action, one for the wrongful death of the mother and one for the
personal injuries suffered by the girl.6 However, the factor of the defend-
ant's negligence was common to both actions. Since it was decided that the
defendant was not negligent in the wrongful death suit, the issue of the
defendant's negligence is permanently determined between the parties to
the wrongful death suit or their privies. However, each person injured
in an accident is entitled to litigate the issue of defendant's negligence
without regard to prior litigation by other persons injured in the same
accident.7 Therefore the plaintiff in the present case would have to be
considered a party to the previous suit or a privy of a party if the finding
on negligence is to be binding on her by the operation of estoppel by
judgment. The plaintiff would also have to be considered a party in the
same capacity in both cases since a judgment is not conclusive as to a mate-
rial fact adjudicated unless the second action is not only between the same
parties but also between them in the same capacity.8
The wrongful death action referred to above was brought under the
Ohio wrongful death statute which provides that "an action for wrongful
death must be brought in the name of the personal representative of the
deceased person, but shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving
spouse, the children, and other next of kin of the decedent." 9 The personal
representative has no interest in the recovery.' 0
From the wording of this statute the court argues that there was
identity of parties in the two causes of action. Identity of parties is not a
mere matter of form but of substance. Courts look beyond the nominal
party whose name appears formally on the record and treat the one whose
interests are involved in litigation as the real party in interest." The
4 Gordon v. Gordon, supra note 1.
5 Kraut v. Cleveland Ry., 132 Ohio St. 125, 5 N.E.2d 324 (1936); Nixon v.
Ogg, 53 Ohio St. 361, 42 N.E. 32 (1895); Hollywood Cartage Co. v. Wheeling & LE.
Ry., 85 Ohio App. 182, 88 N.E.2d 278 (1948); Wharton v. Pollock, 49 Ohio App.
443, 197 N.E. 379 (1934).
6 Gibson v. Solomon, 136 Ohio St. 101, 23 N.E.2d 996 (1939); Mahoning
Valley Ry. v. Van Aistine, Adm'r, 77 Ohio St. 399, 83 N.E. 601 (1908); Keith v.
Willers Truck Serv., 64 S.D. 274, 266 N.W. 256 (1936).
7 Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 710 (1952). In Ohio this is true even between husband and
wife. See Kraut v. Cleveland Ry., supra note 5.
8 Gibson v. Solomon, supra note 6; Annot., 170 A.L.R. 1180 (1947); 30 Am.
Jur. "Judgments" § 398 (1958).
9 Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.02 (1953).
1o Steel v. Kurtz, 28 Ohio St. 191 (1876).
11 Gibson v. Solomon, supra note 6; Keith v. Willers Truck Serv., supra note 6;
Annot., 125 A.L.R. 908 (1940).
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representative in the wrongful death action was the "trustee" for the bene-
ficiaries, 2 and whenever an action may be properly maintained or defended
by a trustee in his representative capacity without joining the beneficiaries,
the latter are necessarily bound by any resulting judgment.13 From this the
court reasons that the plaintiff is precluded from relitigating the issue of
defendant's negligence in the principal case.
It appears that this result is a product of the failure of this court and
previous courts to properly differentiate estoppel by judgment and res
judicata, and in particular, their failure to appreciate the differing sig-
nificance of representation in the operation of the two principles.
As stated before, for either res judicata or estoppel by judgment to
operate, the general rule requires identity of parties in each suit, or at least
privity. The term "parties" has been said to include all who are directly
interested in the subject matter of a suit and who have a right to make
a defense, control the proceedings, examine and cross-examine witnesses,
and appeal from the judgment.14 Where it appears that a person, though
not actually a party, is so represented by an actual party that his interests
receive complete and efficient protection, he is held to be in privity with
the actual party with respect to the cause of action upon which the judgment
is based, and the decree or judgment is binding upon him through the
operation of the doctrine of res judicata. 15
Thus it is not unfair that the statutory beneficiary of a wrongful
death action should be bound by an adjudication of the cause of action
giving rise to the suit. It is in fact essential that the beneficiary should be
so bound; otherwise the defendant would be harassed by repeated wrongful
death actions. However, it is quite another matter to say that the wrongful
death beneficiary is also bound, by the principle of estoppel by judgment,
as to a determination of a material issue affecting his cause of action for
his own personal injuries, incurred in the same accident causing the death.
If the wrongful death beneficiary had no control over the wrongful death
action, it is unfair to preclude him, by a determination in that action, from
relitigating a common issue in a subsequent personal injury action. On the
other hand it is not unfair to the tortfeasor to permit the beneficiary to
relitigate the issues, as a tortfeasor often must do so against successive
adversaries.
This kind of privity by representation, sometimes appropriate in the
application of res judicata, has been carried into the area of estoppel by
judgment in two situations by Ohio courts. In Haines v. Cincinnati Inter-
12 Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Schendel, Adm'r, 270 U.S. 611 (1925); Douglas,
Adm'r v. Daniels Bros. Coal Co., 135 Ohio St. 641, 22 N.E.2d 195 (1939); Wolf,
Adm'r v. Lake Erie & W. Ry., 55 Ohio St. 517, 45 N.E. 708 (1896); Gibson
v. Solomon, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 666 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 136 Ohio St. 101, 23 N.E.2d 996
(1939).
13 Steel v. Kurtz, supra note 10; Gibson v. Solomon, supra note 12.
14 Gallagher v. Harrison, 86 Ohio App. 73, 88 N.E.2d 589 (1949), appeal
dismissed, 152 Ohio St. 254, 88 N.E.2d 921 (1949); 1 Freeman, Judgments § 430
(5th ed. 1925) ; 32 Ohio Jur. 2d "Judgments" § 322 (1958).
15 Gibson v. Solomon, supra note 12; 1 Freeman op. cit. supra note 14, at § 435.
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urban Co.,' 6 Haines, his wife and child were riding in a buggy which
collided with the defendant's car. An action by Haines for personal injuries
resulted in a verdict for the defendant. The determination of the issue of the
defendant's negligence was allowed as a bar to Haines' right to benefit
from a recovery against the defendant in a wrongful death action for
the death of his wife. The decision can be justified by the fact that Haines
controlled the first suit that determined the question of defendant's
negligence. This fact also appears to distinguish the case from the principal
case.
In Gibson v. Solomon,'7 Solomon, as administrator, sued Gibson for
the wrongful death of his wife. Solomon was ruled out as a beneficiary be-
cause of his own contributory negligence, but the verdict was otherwise for
Solomon in his capacity as administrator. Subsequently Gibson sued Solomon
for her personal injuries sustained in the accident, resulting in a judgment
for Solomon. The court stated that the question of negligence could not be
relitigated by either party. The fact that Solomon, as administrator, in
the first suit had control over the action in which the question of negligence
was determined appears at least to some extent to justify the decision, and
distinguishes the case from the principal case.18
It appears that by its holding in the principal case, the court is extending
the doctrine of estoppel by judgment far beyond its logical bounds. The
acceptance of the dissenting opinion of Judge Ross in the court of appeals
in Gibson v. Solomon would have confined estoppel by judgment within its
proper limits:
• . . though represented by the administrator, they (the benefici-
aries) are not parties. . . . A beneficiary is not entitled to be repre-
sented by counsel. . . . He can file no pleadings. He cannot appeal
from the judgment. . . . The plaintiff in the instant action is en-
titled to have that (his) culpability made a matter of exclusive liti-
gation not connected with other issues. 19
A hypothetical case will illustrate the possible ramifications of the
principal case. Suppose a beneficiary in a wrongful death action, who was
permanently injured himself in the accident causing the death, has only a
small interest in any recovery that might be allowed. Would it not create
a great injustice to hold that a decision on the negligence issue favorable
to the defendant in the wrongful death action, over which the beneficiary
had no control and in which he has only a very slight interest, would pre-
clude this beneficiary from litigating that issue in a subsequent suit for
his own personal injuries?
In the principal case the court appears to consider only the policy of
protecting the defendant from harassment and the public from multi-
plicity of suits, without regard to the fact that the rights of the parties should
16 Haines v. Cincinnati Interurban Co., 7 Ohio L. Rep. 48, 31 Ohio C.C.R.
(ns.) 265 (Ct. App. 1909).
17 Gibson v. Solomon, supra note 6.
18 For an annotation discussing the Gibson case which disagrees with this
position, see Annot., 125 A.L.R. 908 (1940).
19 Gibson v. Solomon, supra note 12.
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be determined. The court apparently ignores the fundamental right of every
person to have his day in court. This right is denied unwittingly when a
litigant is denied recovery on her individual cause of action by reason of a
determination rendered in a suit on a different cause of action over which
she had no control. The extension of the doctrine of estoppel by judgment,
by the uncritical application of principles appropriate only to res judicata,
should be discontinued. The doctrine of estoppel by judgment should be
confined within its proper limits so as to prevent the possibility of injustice
in situations like the one present in the principal case.
